We study a Bayesian game of two-sided incomplete information in which an agent, who owns a project of unknown quality, considers proposing it to an evaluator, who has the choice of whether or not to accept it. There exist two distinct tiers of evaluation that di¤er in the bene…ts they deliver to the agent upon acceptance of a project. The agent has to select the tier to which the project is submitted for review. Making a proposal incurs a cost on the agent in the form of a submission cost. We examine the e¤ect of changes in the payo¤ parameters at the two tiers of evaluation on the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcome. We show that changes in these parameters that are aimed at increasing the level of self-screening exerted by the agent do not necessarily have bene…cial e¤ects either on the quality of projects submitted for review or on the quality of projects that are implemented. From a methodological viewpoint, our paper proposes a novel method of performing comparative statics in games whose equilibria are de…ned by a system of equations with no closed-form solution.
Introduction
On July 5, 2011 the jury reached its verdict in the case State of Florida vs. Casey Marie Anthony and found the defendant not guilty in the death of her daughter. The verdict surprised the media and the general public as strong circumstantial evidence implicated the defendant in the crime.
The outcome was deemed by some as a symptomatic failure of the judicial system, but many law experts viewed it, instead, to be a consequence of prosecutorial overreach in that particular trial.
For instance, Scott Bonn, a professor of criminology at Drew University, argued in a New York Daily News article that "the prosecutor employed an extremely high-risk strategy by charging her with …rst-degree murder and, in addition, asking for capital punishment", and therefore that the "strenuous burden of proof weighed heavily on the state throughout the trial". 1 He concludes that the prosecutors should have …lled a lesser charge that was more likely to be accepted by the jury.
Instead, because the "no double jeopardy" principle guarantees that a person cannot be prosecuted a second time for the same crime once a jury returns a verdict, the defendant walked away free.
It was often argued in the aftermath of the jury decision in the Casey Anthony trial that the apparent prosecutorial overreach may have been caused by the media hype surrounding the trial which increased the stakes on the prosecution to obtain a maximum penalty so as to appease the public opinion. 2 At the same time, in other more routine trials, when a prosecutor makes his decision, he may also account for the cost of …ling more severe charges (or of …ling any charges at all), in terms of resources spent on collecting and organizing evidence and of time spent in court. 3 These raise the questions of how payo¤s impact the decisions of parties involved in such situations, and how these payo¤s should be adjusted, when feasible, so as to improve the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcome. Addressing these questions is the main objective of our paper.
We model these situations as a Bayesian game of two-sided incomplete information where an agent (the prosecutor), who owns a project (the case) of unknown quality (guilty or not guilty), considers submitting it to an evaluator (the jury), who upon receiving a project for review, has the choice of whether or not to accept it. The di¤erent charges that the prosecutor may …le are 1 The article is available at http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/casey-anthony-trial-case-overzealousprosecution-death-penalty-bar-high-article-1.160804. See also, for instance, a Los Angeles Times article by a law attorney http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/09/opinion/la-oe-shapiro-caylee-anthony-20110709 2 Time magazine called this case the "social media trial of the century" http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2077969,00.html.
As of 2013, a Google search for Casey Anthony yields more results than the search for the U.S. Senate Majority Leader at the time. 3 In fact, avoiding some of these costs is also the reason behind prosecutors'willingness to settle in many trials.
modelled as ranked tiers of evaluation to which the project can be submitted. In this paper we analyze the simplest case of two tiers, which we refer to in the following as the upper and the lower tier, respectively. The upper tier delivers higher bene…ts to the agent upon acceptance, and higher losses to the evaluator upon acceptance of a low-quality project. For instance, in a trial like Casey Anthony, …ling more severe charges leads to better rewards to the prosecutor following a favorable ruling, but also increases the stakes on the jury, making it less likely to return a guilty verdict. In our model, we abstract away from incorporating the actual trial proceedings, and instead assume that prior to taking their actions, each player performs an assessment of the project that yields a private signal of quality. 4 The agent then has to choose whether or not to submit the project, and in the relevant case, the tier to which to submit it. Upon receiving a project for review into a certain tier, the evaluator observes his signal and then decides whether or not to accept it.
The scope of applications captured by the model of project screening with tiered evaluation that we study in this paper extends beyond our particular motivating example. This framework can describe, in general, situations where an agent contemplates making a costly 5 proposal of a project of unknown quality to an evaluator while facing a trade-o¤ between the risk of being rejected and the higher bene…ts resulting from a better placement of the project. As an example, consider a manufacturer of a newly invented product whose value to consumers takes time to perfectly assess.
In this case, when launching the product, the …rm has to decide on the claims to make regarding its value to the users and on its price. Marketing the product as a high-value item generates larger revenues if the product is adopted, but also makes it more likely to fail as consumers may be reluctant to pay the higher price. 6 Another example is the selling of an used car (or of any other pre-owned item whose quality cannot be perfectly evaluated, such as a house), where the owner can choose di¤erent degrees of disclosure of its mechanical issues. Disclosing no issues (submitting to a higher tier) reduces the likelihood of a sale, as the buyer may identify them, in which case he would distrust the seller and walk away, but if that does not happen, the selling price is higher. On the other hand, being more honest (submitting to the lower tier) reduces the sale price, but as long 4 The jury's signal distribution, conditional on the guilt of the defendant, may be an (unmodelled) function of the optimal persuasion strategies adopted by the prosecution and defense teams. 5 The submission fee may be a payment toward the evaluator or a third entity, or it may take a non-monetary form, such as a cost incurred by the agent in terms of time or resources spent on preparing the application or in terms of time by which the evaluator's decision is delayed. 6 In certain situations, an unsuccessful high-end high-price product can be reintroduced as a lower-end item; in others, a competitor may …ll in the spot. For instance, the marketing of Apple personal computers as such expensive high-end items in the 1980s allowed Microsoft OS based PCs to dominate the market for the next 25 years. as these mechanical issues are not too severe, results in a sale with higher probability. 7 Because of the variety of these situations, we will present our analysis in the framework of a generic Bayesian game and then identify the relevant implications of its …ndings for applications of interest.
This paper contributes to the literature that investigates the role of payo¤s on the e¢ ciency of project screening initiated by Leslie (2005) , who argued in the context of the academic scholarship review process that the optimal submission fees are strictly positive 8 because they reduce the burden on editors and referees by discouraging long-shot submissions. 9 Departing from earlier papers in this literature, in a framework with one tier of evaluation, Barbos (2013) considers the case of two-sided incomplete information where not only the agent's, but also the evaluator's assessment of the project is imperfect. Under this speci…cation, while a higher submission cost does increase the quality of projects that the agent submits, it may not always be bene…cial, as it also induces the evaluator to weaken his standards of acceptance, and under certain conditions, a higher submission fee decreases the expected quality of projects that are implemented.
Our analysis unveils four main insights which we present next.
1. We …rst investigate the assortative matching between the agent's signal of quality and the rank of the tier to which he submits the project. We show that if the bene…t upon acceptance at the upper tier is high enough, then negative assortative matching may emerge in equilibrium, where projects with low signals of quality are submitted to the upper tier while projects of higher quality are submitted to the lower tier. In certain applications, negative assortative matching may be noticeable with a su¢ ciently large sample of outcomes, and thus likely to be averted in the long run through an exogenous adjustment in payo¤s, but this …nding suggests that it may still emerge in the short run following a sudden shift in payo¤ parameters. In other situations, negative matching could persist even in the long run. For instance, if the potential pro…ts following a successful product launch as a high-end item are su¢ ciently high, manufacturers of products that have a relatively long shot at success may decide to pursue that avenue just in case the favorable outcome realizes, while manufacturers of products that are more likely to succeed may choose to 7 Selling the car as scrap or donating it would correspond to not submitting the project. 8 The optimal fees are not unboudedly high because in these models, the evaluators need to accept a minimum number of articles. In our paper, we discard this requirement on the evaluator so as to capture situations of project screening beyond that of the academic articles evaluation examined in those papers. 9 See also Azar (2007) and the references therein. Cotton (2013) distinguishes between monetary costs and time delays and shows that when authors of academic articles are heterogenous, the optimal fee structure implies a combination of these monetary and non-monetary fees. Boleslavsky and Cotton (2013) study a model in which an evaluator has to select one of several competing proposals of unknown quality, and investigate the e¤ect of the limited capacity of the evaluator to accept proposals on the incentives of the proposers to produce information. follow a safer approach and have their product be adopted with almost certainty. 10 The same outcome may realize in the used car selling example if the payo¤ from deceiving is su¢ ciently high.
2. Focusing on equilibria with positive assortative matching, we next examine the e¤ect of payo¤ parameters on the quality of projects submitted for review. Previous literature, analyzing the case of a single tier of evaluation, argued that an increase in the submission cost (or, equivalently, a decrease in the agent's bene…t upon acceptance) induces more self-screening on the part of the agent, increasing the quality of projects that he submits. We show that this is no longer necessarily the case with a tiered system of evaluation. In particular, a higher submission cost at the upper tier actually decreases the quality of projects submitted between the two tiers. In our main motivating application, this suggests that when prosecutors have less incentive to …le the more severe charges (either because of an increase in the cost of collecting the additional evidence or because of a decrease in the potential rewards), they will end up …ling the lesser charges in cases that otherwise they would not have been pursued, increasing the burden on the judicial system.
On the other hand, a higher cost at the lower tier does discourage marginal submissions to that tier, and therefore increases the quality of projects received between the two tiers, suggesting a mechanism for reducing the number of projects submitted for evaluation. However, it has an indeterminate e¤ect on the quality of projects submitted at either tier individually, and in particular it may actually even lower the average quality of projects received by both tiers.
3. The third insight of the paper relates payo¤ parameters with the expected quality of projects that are implemented, i.e. of projects that are submitted and accepted. We show that the e¤ect of changes in payo¤s at the upper tier can be elicited solely from the evaluator's information structure in the neighborhood of his equilibrium strategy. In particular, for the same class of information structures identi…ed by Barbos (2013) in the case of a system of evaluation with a single tier, a higher submission cost at the upper tier increases the expected quality of projects that are implemented by each of the two tiers. On the other hand, the e¤ect of changes in the payo¤ parameters at the lower tier is a function of the underlying information structure and the direction of the e¤ects on the quality of projects that are submitted. This illustrates again the di¤erential impact on equilibrium e¢ ciency of the payo¤ parameters at the two tiers.
Similarly to the other …ndings in this paper, the potential decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented, following an increase in the level of self-screening exerted by the agent, hinges on the assumption of imprecise evaluation, which renders the evaluator a strategic player who adjusts his acceptance policy in response to changes in the quality of projects submitted for review. From a policy perspective, our …ndings suggest that in those situations where there is reason to believe that the evaluator may infer information from the agent's decision, such as if a prosecutor's choice of charges in a trial is likely to in ‡uence the jury's beliefs, then when adjusting payo¤ parameters, a policy designer has to account for that fact that an increase in the perceived quality of projects submitted for review may come at the expense of the evaluator's own judgment of the project.
4. The last result of the paper compares the equilibria of games with one and two tiers of evaluation. Introducing a new upper tier in a system of evaluation where only one tier had existed increases both the quality of projects submitted for review and the quality of projects implemented between the two tiers. Introducing a new lower tier decreases the burden of evaluation at the upper tier suggesting a mechanism for reducing the overall cost of evaluation when the cost of reviewing a project in the upper tier is su¢ ciently higher than in the lower tier. These insights provide support for a tiered system of evaluation as a more e¢ cient project-screening mechanism.
From a methodological viewpoint, our paper proposes a novel method of performing comparative statics in games whose equilibria are de…ned by a system of equations with no closed-form solution.
Several other papers from the literature examined optimal submission strategies when facing a tiered system of evaluation, in particular in a context where economic agents seek certi…cation for their products from information intermediaries, such as ratings agencies. For instance, Farhi, Lerner, and Tirole (2008) study how the market structure and in particular the evaluator's rejection disclosure policy a¤ect the choices of such agents, Lerner and Tirole (2006) investigate the role of biased technology standard setting authorities as certi…ers, while Gill and Sgroi (2012) consider the case where an agent who submits a project for certi…cation also has the ability to set the price for that item, thus endogenizing the payo¤s from acceptance. On the other hand, in the academic publishing context, Heintzelman and Nocetti (2009) con…rm the insight from Leslie (2005) in a search theoretical model where an author facing multiple journals has to decide on the optimal submission path. Our paper di¤ers from the papers in this literature in that we consider a set-up with two-sided incomplete information where evaluation is imperfect and thus the agent has to account for the fact that the evaluator learns from his decision. 11 At a formal level, the paper 1 1 Heintzelman and Nocetti (2009) also discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information, but in their framework closer to ours is Taylor and Yildirim (2011) , who study a model of project proposals in which an agent chooses the amount of e¤ort to exert in generating a project that is then submitted for review. A blind review system, in which payo¤ relevant information about the proposer is hidden from the reviewer, is compared with an informed regime in which the proposer's type is public information. While their results are driven by the moral hazard e¤ects of the potentially available public information, we consider the e¤ort level as sunk, and the agent's decision to be whether and where to submit a project, as a function of the available public and private information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de…nes the model, while in section 3 we characterize the equilibrium of the game. In section 4 we investigate the e¤ect of submission fees on equilibrium strategies and on the e¢ ciency of the outcome. Section 5 concludes.
The model
There are two players, an agent (A) and an evaluator (E). A owns a project and considers proposing it to E. The project is of either high (h) or low (l) quality. The common prior probability of state h is . There are two tiers of evaluation, A and B, and when A submits a project, he has to select the tier to which to submit it. Upon receiving a project for review into a certain tier, E has the choice of whether or not to accept it. Submitting the project to tier t 2 fA; Bg incurs a fee c t on A. Irrespective of its ex-post observed quality, a project accepted in tier t, yields A a payo¤ b t . A also has the option to not submit the project; the corresponding payo¤ is normalized to zero. E's payo¤ from accepting a high-quality project in either tier is 1, while the loss incurred by E from accepting a low-quality project in tier t is L t . E's payo¤ from rejecting a project is normalized to zero. 12 A project that is rejected once cannot be resubmitted for review to either tier. 13 We make the following assumption on the payo¤ parameters of the model.
the model becomes intractable under this assumption. 1 2 The analysis does not change in a meaningful way if we allow the agent's payo¤ to also depend on the quality of the project by having him prefer that an accepted project is of high quality. See section 3 for the discussion. Also, the analysis also does not change if we allow that the evaluator be also concerned with the quality of projects that he rejects. Finally, since the submission fee may often take a non-monetary form, we do not include it in the evaluator's payo¤. This is without too much loss of generality for the ensuing results. These simplifying modelling speci…cations are also adopted elsewhere in the literature (see for instance, Cotton (2013)). 1 3 In line with the motivating example from the introduction, we thus restrict attention to the analysis of those situations when resubmission of a rejected project to a di¤erent tier is not possible. By (i ) and (ii ), tier A delivers a better absolute and relative reward to A from an accepted project than tier B. We will refer to A and B as the upper and lower tier, respectively. Part (iii ) implies that E is aversely a¤ected more by the acceptance of a low-quality project in the upper tier.
Prior to making their decisions, A and E perform assessments of the project that result in subjective evaluations of its quality. A's assessment yields a private signal 2 [0; 1]; E's assessment yields a private signal 2 [0; 1]. For quality q 2 fh; lg, let G q ( ) and F q ( ) denote the cumulative distribution functions of the agent and the evaluators'signals, respectively. Also, let g q ( ) > 0 and f q ( ) > 0 be the corresponding probability density functions.
Assumption 2 (i) f q and g q are bounded and twice continuously di¤ erentiable for q 2 fh; lg;
Part (ii ) of the assumption is the usual monotone likelihood ratio, essentially implying that a higher signal is more informative of a high-quality project.
The equilibrium
Consider some arbitrary strategies of A and E, respectively, S ag : [0; 1] ! fs A ; s B ; ng and S ev :
fA;Bg [0; 1] ! fa; rg, that map signals into actions, with the obvious interpretation of the action labels. Upon observing a project submitted to tier t, and after acquiring the signal , E accepts the project if and only if
where the event fs t g f 2 [0; 1] : S ag ( ) = s t g. Denoting the event fa t g f 2 [0; 1] :
to
and does not submit the project in the remaining case.
In appendix A1 we show that in any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, E adopts a cuto¤ strategy with respect to his informative signal, according to which he accepts a project if and only if his signal is higher than a threshold speci…c to each tier. Since E's equilibrium strategy can be de…ned in terms of the corresponding thresholds, for the rest of the paper, we will use ( As ; Bs ) to denote a generic cuto¤ strategy, with thresholds of acceptance for the two tiers As and Bs , respectively. We also show in appendix A1 that the set of values of for which A submits projects to a particular tier is an interval (possibly empty), and that the set of values of for which A does not submit a project consists of either one (possibly empty) or two disjoint intervals.
The next lemma states that, under assumption 1, if E adopts a cuto¤ strategy ( As ; Bs ), with
Bs
As , then A's best response is to never submit to tier B. In other words, if E is more stringent at the lower tier, then A never submits projects to that tier. Its proof from appendix A2
shows that if Bs As , then whenever A has a higher expected payo¤ from submitting to tier B than to A, then that payo¤ is in fact negative. In the following we thus examine the interesting equilibria where the evaluator is more stringent at the upper tier, i.e., where Bs < As .
Lemma 3.1 If Bs
As , then A either submits the project to tier A or does not submit it at all.
In appendix A3, we examine the agent's best response function and provide the necessary and su¢ cient condition for positive assortative matching between the agent's signal of quality and the rank of the tier to whom he submits a project. More precisely, we identify the condition on As , Bs , and the payo¤ parameters of the model under which for a given prior , the set of signals for which A submits to the upper tier A is above the set of signals for which he submits to B. 14 The condition is not always satis…ed, and thus negative assortative matching may emerge, where
A submits projects with low signals to the upper tier, and projects with high signals to the lower tier. The following remark presents the conditions under which this occurs. The precise formal de…nitions of these conditions follow from the analysis presented in the appendix.
Remark 3.1 Negative assortative matching emerges when the following conditions are satis…ed:
Moderate values of Bs allow a high level of identi…cation of the quality of the project when submitting it to B because, under the monotone likelihood property, the di¤erence F l ( Bs ) F h ( Bs ) is in its highest range, implying that E will observe a signal Bs with high probability, conditional on h, and with a low probability, conditional on l. Thus, when the conditions (ii ) and
(iii ) of Remark 3.1 are satis…ed, if A has a project with a high signal, he prefers submitting it to tier B, to have it identi…ed as of high quality and thus accepted, rather than submitting it to A,
where the probability of acceptance is small because of the stringent standards implied by the high value of As . When A's signal is lower (but not too low), he will submit to A because the high bene…t/cost ratio, as suggested by condition (i ), will allow for a non-negative payo¤ in spite of the low probability of acceptance. For the lowest signals, A will refrain from submitting the project.
On the other hand, given this strategy adopted by A, E's best response is precisely to employ very high standards of acceptance to the upper tier and moderate ones to the lower tier. Thus, negative assortative matching may occur in equilibrium.
This is an interesting and surprising insight, as it suggests that when the project evaluation relies insu¢ ciently on the agent's self-screening mechanism at the upper tier (i.e., when b A c A is high), thus requiring the evaluator to rely heavily on his own assessment of the project at that tier by imposing very high acceptance standards, then negative assortative matching may emerge. In many applications this type of matching may be noticeable in the long run once a su¢ ciently large sample of outcomes is observed, and thus payo¤s may be exogenously adjusted so as to restore a natural positive matching. However, Remark 3.1 suggests that following sudden changes in payo¤s, such as when b A increases su¢ ciently so as to induce the upper tier to attract low quality projects, forcing the evaluator to impose very strict standards of acceptance at the upper tier, then owners of high quality projects may prefer to submit their projects at the lower tier where acceptance is almost guaranteed. Such a sudden shift may occur, for instance, when a criminal trial draws the national media attention and, becoming emotionally overcharged, increases the pressure on prosecutors to seek a higher penalty. On the other hand, as argued in the Introduction, it is possible that in other situations negative assortative matching may persist as a long run equilibrium behavior if submitting to the upper tier continues to remain highly attractive.
We focus the rest of the analysis on the interesting case of interior equilibria with positive assortative matching where both tiers receive submissions and where the set of values of for which the agent does not submit the project is an interval. 15 More precisely, we investigate properties of equilibria in which A adopts a cuto¤ strategy characterized by two thresholds ( As ; Bs ), with As 2 (0; 1), Bs 2 ( As ; 1), such that A submits to tier A for 2 [ As ; 1], to tier B for 2 [ Bs ; As ), and does not submit the project for 2 [0; Bs ). We will assume thus implicitly throughout the rest of the paper that the parameters of the model are such that the corresponding equilibria satisfy this regularity property, without explicitly mentioning this assumption each time.
The next two lemmas present the equations that de…ne implicitly the two players'best response functions in these Bayesian Nash equilibria. Their proofs are in appendices A4 and A5. 16 Lemma 3.2 Given E's cuto¤ strategy, ( As ; Bs ), with As > Bs , A's best response is characterized by two thresholds A ( As ; Bs ) and B ( As ; Bs ), with A ( As ; Bs ) > B ( As ; Bs ), implicitly de…ned by the equations in A and B , respectively 
and accepts a project submitted to tier B if and only if B ( As ; Bs ), with B ( As ; Bs ) given
no submissions. To focus our analysis on developing intuition rather than solving for corner solutions, we restrict attention to the case of interior equilibria. 1 6 We can model a situation in which A also prefers that an accepted project is of high quality, by having A receive an additional bene…t t under this contingency. In this case, equation (4) (3) and (5) The best-response functions, as elicited by equations (4), (5) , (6) and (7), determine the equilibrium strategies of the two players denoted by ( A ; B ) and ( A ; B ). The next lemma, whose proof is in appendix A6, presents the monotonicities of these best-response functions. Lemma 3.4 (i) A ( As ; Bs ) is decreasing in Bs and increasing in As ; (ii) B ( As ; Bs ) is constant in As and increasing in Bs ; (iii) A ( As ; Bs ) is decreasing in As and constant in Bs ;
(iv) B ( As ; Bs ) is decreasing in As and Bs , when As > Bs .
For generic payo¤ parameters and information structures, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game is not necessarily unique. As in other models, multiple equilibria may emerge because there exist di¤erent sets of self-ful…lling expectations for the same set of fundamentals of the model. The next proposition identi…es a consistency requirement across di¤erent equilibria. Its corollary provides a su¢ cient condition for equilibrium uniqueness. (4) and (7), have the unique …xed point ( A ; B ). Then, if
the equilibrium is unique.
Before presenting the proof of these two results, we introduce the three panels in Figure 1 on which we rely heavily in the rest of the analysis. In each panel, we depict the pairwise best-response functions de…ned by (4)- (7) , when the two variables not considered in the respec- 
Similarly, the dashed curve z A ( As ) represents the best-response function A ( As ; 0 B ), i.e., the implicit function de…ned by the same equation only that 0 B replaces B . When there is no dashed curve, the function is the same in the two equilibria. For instance, in panel (a), o A ( As ) represents the best-response functions A ( As ; B ) and A ( As ; 0 B ), which by lemma 3.4(iii ) are the same (both functions are de…ned implicitly by the equation 1
All curves from the three panels are generic and are depicted only so as to exhibit the salient monotonicity property. In panel (c), since both curves are decreasing, they are presented as crossing each other twice, so as to allow for either of them crossing from below. To save on notation, we de…ne a partial order on these curves by saying that for instance z
as is the case in panel (c), the …rst curve is above the second one in a panel with on the horizontal axis and on the vertical axis.
Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 3.1. To prove proposition 1, …rst note in panel (a) that
The second implication is consistent with the initial assumption from the text of the proposition. Finally, in panel (c), 0 Figure 1 (more precisely, the intersection of the two curves in the upper left corner) it follows that it must be that 0 B < B and 0 A > A . This is inconsistent with the initial assumption that 0 B > B . Thus the initial equilibrium is unique. Now, note that the slope of o B ( As ) at the equilibrium values equals h
which, since both sides are negative, can be rewritten as in (8).
Proposition 1 shows that if E is more stringent in his acceptance policy for tier B in equilibrium 0 , (i.e., 0 B > B ), then …rst, A is more reluctant to submit marginal projects to tier B, ( 0 B > B ), and second, A is more inclined to submit marginal projects to tier A, ( 0 A < A ), since the alternative is less appealing. Given these, E is also more stringent in his acceptance policy at tier A, ( 0 A > A ), to make up for the lower expected quality of projects submitted. While these feed-forward e¤ects make the result intuitive, proposition 1 ensures that the feed-back e¤ects, such as the e¤ect of the increase in A on A , or of the decrease in A on B , do not o¤set them.
To understand corollary 3.1, consider two equilibria, and 0 , with corresponding strategies as in the text of proposition 1. Note then that for a …xed value of B , a higher value of A , ( 0 A > A ), would induce A to increase; in other words, if E is more stringent at tier A, then A is more reluctant to submit marginal projects to that tier. A higher A , together with a higher B , be very responsive to a decrease in A , while A has to be very responsive to an increase in B ; these would o¤set the e¤ects of the increases in B and A . In panel (c), this is the case precisely when o B ( As ) and o A ( Bs ) intersect in the lower right corner where both have a steeper slope.
Equation (8) is the mathematical representation of the same condition.
Results
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the agent's preference parameters on the equilibrium outcome. Upon inspecting (4) and (5), one can notice that the sign of the e¤ect of an increase in the bene…t from having a project accepted into a given tier is the same with that of a decrease in the corresponding submission cost. 18 Since most papers from the related literature examine the role of submission costs, we will focus our analysis on the same parameters, while keeping in mind that its results are immediately interpretable in terms of changes in bene…ts from acceptance in the relevant tier.
This section is organized as follows. In section 4.1, we present as a benchmark the main result from Barbos (2013) for the model with one tier of evaluation. In section 4.2, we examine the e¤ect of increases in the submission costs at the two tiers of evaluation on the equilibrium strategies, and then in section 4.3, we employ these comparative statics results to investigate the e¤ect of changes in payo¤s on the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcome. Finally, in section 4.4 we proceed in a di¤erent direction and examine the e¢ ciency e¤ect of the introducing of a second tier in a system of evaluation where initially only one tier had existed.
The model with one tier of evaluation
Consider a model as in section 2, only that with one tier of evaluation. In this case the agent has to decide only on whether or not to submit the project for review. The next lemma states that in the resulting game, an equilibrium exists, is unique, and must be in cuto¤ strategies. The expected quality of projects that are implemented in this equilibrium, h Pr (hj
), is isomorphic to the probability Pr (hj ;
). 19 The next proposition elicits the e¤ect of an increase in the submission cost, c, on this measure.
The term f h ( ) f l ( ) is the likelihood of the state h as inferred from E's equilibrium minimum acceptance standard . On the other hand, given E's cuto¤ strategy, 1 F h ( ) 1 F l ( ) is the likelihood of state h as inferred from the fact that E accepted a project. Thus, in a model with one tier of evaluation, a higher submission cost increases the quality of projects that are implemented if and only if the elasticity of the likelihood of a high quality project that is inferred from the E's minimum standard is higher than the elasticity of the likelihood of a high quality project that is inferred from the fact that E accepted a project. Since the intuition of this result resembles those of the corresponding results from a model with multiple tiers, we defer presenting it to section 4.3.
The e¤ects of submission fees on equilibrium strategies
In the model with multiple tiers of evaluation, with generic signal distributions, it is not tractable to obtain a closed-form solution for the equilibrium strategies amenable to direct comparative statics analysis. Instead, we employ a novel strategy of performing a comparative statics analysis in the following three steps. First, we identify all correlations between the signs of the changes in the equilibrium strategies that are imposed by (4)- (7) under the assumed change in the underlying parameter. Second, we identify the paths of the equilibrium strategies that are consistent with these correlations. Finally, for each equilibrium path, we verify that the shifts in the best-response functions that are imposed by the changes in the underlying parameter and in the equilibrium strategies are consistent with the assumed changes in the equilibrium strategies. At this step, we identify the equilibrium paths that may emerge only because of the multiplicity of equilibria.
The case of a change in c A We start with the case of an increase in c A . 20 Assuming that c A increases by dc A > 0, by inspecting (4)- (7) , one can infer the following necessary correlations among the possible changes in the equilibrium strategies. The result in (a) reads as follows. If an increase in c A leads to an increase the equilibrium value of A and to a decrease in B , then by (4), it must be that it also leads to an increase in A . On the other hand, (b) means that if following the same increase in c A , the equilibrium value of B increases then B must increase, while if B decreases then B must decrease. Using these results, we have the following possible equilibrium paths following an increase in c A . The …rst of the two equilibrium paths is intuitive. Upon facing a higher c A , A is less inclined to submit marginal products to tier A, and thus A increases. The increase in A leads to an increase in the expected quality of projects received by tier A, which allows E to lower the corresponding standards, and thus A decreases. The increase in A also leads to an increase in the expected quality of projects submitted to tier B, which allows E to also lower B . This makes A more willing to submit marginal projects to tier B, and thus B decreases. We depict these in Figure 2 
Assume d
As seen in the …gure, the equilibrium path is consistent with either type of initial equilibrium.
As we show next, the second equilibrium path can arise only when the initial equilibrium is not unique. Essentially, this scenario emerges as a consequence of a coordination of expectations on a di¤erent equilibrium in response to a change in the parameters of the model, rather than being 2 1 Thus, for instance, o A ( As) represents the best response function A ( As; B ), as de…ned by (4), when the submission fee to tier A is cA, while x A ( As) represents A ( As; B ) when the submission fee in (4) is c 0 A . On the other hand, z A ( As), which is de…ned below, represents A ( As; 0 B ) when the submission fee to tier A is c 0 A . Finally, o A ( As ) represents A ( As ; B ) when the submission fee to tier A is cA or c 0 A , but also A ( As ; 0 B ) when the fee to tier A is cA or c 0 A . Note also that, for instance in panel (c) the values A and B from the initial equilibrium are at the intersection of the curves o A ( Bs) and o B ( As ), while the corresponding values from the equilibrium 0 are at the intersection of the curves z A ( Bs) and z B ( As ).
driven by an adjustment of players'strategies within the same equilibrium. Note that in panel (c)
of Figure 3 , dc A > 0 and
Thus, the only ways to have d B > 0 and d A < 0 are either if the initial equilibrium is in the upper left corner and the two curves do not satisfy the single crossing condition, or if the initial equilibrium is in the lower right corner where o A ( Bs ) crosses o B ( As ) from above. These are precisely the conditions under which the equilibrium is not necessarily unique.
We collect these results in the following proposition. Focusing on the case when the equilibrium is unique, note that while a higher c A does increase the quality of projects submitted to tier A (as d A > 0), it also decreases the quality of projects submitted between the two tiers (as d B < 0). Therefore, unlike the case of a system of evaluation with one tier, in a system with multiple tiers, a higher submission cost is not unequivocally bene…cial for the quality of projects submitted for review because higher submission costs at the upper tiers decrease the quality of projects submitted to the lower tiers. This insight hinges on the underlying assumption that evaluation is imprecise; if evaluation was precise, a higher c A has no e¤ect on the agent's decision at the margin on whether to submit a project to tier B or to forgo submitting it.
In addition to the interpretation of this …nding in the context of a trial that was mentioned in the Introduction, proposition 3 has interesting implications in other situations captured by our model. For instance, in the case of a new product launch, it implies that a higher cost of launching a product as a high-end item (or a decrease in the potential bene…t from successfully marketing a product as such) leads the …rm to launch as low-end items some products that would have otherwise been discarded. Intuitively, because buyers are more con…dent in products advertised as low-end products (since they are aware that the …rm has less incentive to skim the better products to launch them as high-end), the …rm is more willing to launch such products of marginal quality as low-end products as the buyers are more likely to adopt them. On the other hand, in the car selling example, it implies that when the bene…t from hiding a mechanical issue is higher, then fewer cars are being put up for sale since buyers expect cars with disclosed issues to be of lower quality.
The case of a change in c B Similarly to the previous analysis, assuming dc B > 0 (or db B < 0), one can infer the following necessary correlations among equilibrium strategies. Therefore, the equilibrium paths that can emerge when c B increases are the following.
1. Assume d B > 0 and d B > 0. By (d), it follows that d A < 0, and then by (c) that d A > 0.
The third step of the analysis is along the lines of the case of an increase in c A and is omitted.
On the …rst three equilibrium paths, when dc B > 0, A is more reluctant to submit low-signal marginal projects to tier B, and thus d B > 0. On the …rst two of these paths, A also abstains from submitting high-signal marginal projects to tier B, and thus d A < 0. If the net e¤ect on the quality of projects submitted to tier B is negative, E becomes more stringent in his acceptance policy at tier B, and so d B > 0, as on the …rst equilibrium path. If the net e¤ect is positive, E is less stringent, and so d B < 0, as on the second equilibrium path. On both paths E becomes more stringent at tier A since the expected quality of projects received at that tier is lower. The third equilibrium path occurs when the quality of projects submitted to tier B increases signi…cantly following the increase in B . In this case, B decreases su¢ ciently so as to induce an increase in A , and a consequent decrease in A . The last equilibrium path emerges again only when the initial equilibrium is not necessarily unique. 22 We collect these results in the next proposition. Focusing again on the case of unique equilibria, the …rst insight of proposition 4 is that a higher cost of submitting to the lower tier increases the quality of projects submitted between the two tiers (as B increases). Therefore, in a situation with a tiered system of evaluation such as the one from our motivating example of a prosecutor's choice of charges in a criminal trial, a mechanism designer interested in reducing the number of projects submitted for review can proceed by increasing the cost of submission to the lower tier (or by reducing the corresponding bene…ts). This is in contrast to an increase in the cost at the upper tier, which, as elicited in proposition 3, has the opposite e¤ect. However, note that while the quality of projects received between the two tiers increases, the average quality of projects received individually by both tiers may simultaneously decrease. This 2 2 To see this, note the following in a ( As ; Bs) panel. First, from (4), dcB > 0 implies o A ( Bs)
x A ( Bs). Second, also from lemma 3.4(i ), is the case on path (i ) where d B > 0 and d A > 0 imply that the evaluator needs to be more stringent at both tiers since he receives projects of lower quality in each of them. 23 Proposition 4 also suggests that in those situations where the sign of the e¤ect on one equilibrium strategy is observed after a change in payo¤s at the lower tier, then it may be possible to infer the signs of the e¤ects on the other strategies without observing them. For instance, if after an increase in prosecutors' cost of …ling the lesser charges (dc B > 0), it is observed that prosecutors are less inclined to …le not only the lesser charges (d B > 0, which is expected), but also the more severe charges (d A > 0), then it can be inferred that juries require a lower burden of proof for both types of charges (d B < 0 and d A < 0). This is because d A > 0 identi…es path (iii ) out of the three possible paths elicited in proposition 4. Similarly, if after an increase in c B , juries are observed to demand a higher burden of proof for the lesser charges (d B > 0), it must be that juries are also more demanding for the severe charges (d A > 0), and that prosecutors are more inclined to …le the severe charges (d A < 0). Again, the decrease in A identi…es path (i ). Finally, a decrease in the burden of proof required for the severe charges identi…es path (iii ).
The e¤ects of submission fees on the equilibrium expected quality of the projects that are implemented
In this section, we examine the e¤ect of a change in the two submission costs on the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcome. 24 The measures of e¢ ciency that we employ here are the expected qualities of projects implemented by the evaluator in the two tiers, which are isomorphic with Pr (hj A ; A ), for tier A, and Pr (hj A B ; B ), for tier B. The next proposition elicits the e¤ect of an increase in c A on these two values. We restrict attention again to the interesting case where the initial equilibrium is unique, and thus the comparative statics are driven by the fundamentals of the model rather than equilibrium selection.
Proposition 5 Assume that the equilibrium ( A ; B ; A ; B ) is unique. Then 2 3 As an example, assume Pr(hj ) = , and that is distributed uniformly on f0:1; 0:2; 0:6; 0:7g. Also, assume that initially B = 0:05 and A = 0:65, while after the increase in cB, 0 B = 0:15 and 0 A = 0:55. Then, in the initial equilibrium, the average value of for projects submitted to tier B is (0:1 + 0:2 + 0:6) =3 = 0:3, while for tier A is 0:7. After in increase in cB, in the new equilibrium, the former average is 0:2, while the latter is 0:65. 2 4 Note that unlike some of the other papers from the literature, we do not calculate the optimal values of these payo¤s parameters, but only elicit the e¤ect of a change in them on the expected quality of projects that are implemented by the evaluator in the two tiers. In fact, in a variety of situations, these costs can be adjusted only at the margin. For instance, while laws can be passed to make a prosecutor's job of collecting evidence less costly, this may be possible only up to a limited extent.
Proof. By Bayes'Rule, we have
where for the third equality we used the conditional independence of the two players'signals. Therefore, Pr (hj ; ) increases following an increase in c A if and only if the sum ln (6), written in equilibrium, we have ln
Since by proposition 3, we have d A dc A < 0 the proof of part (i ) is complete. The proof of part (ii ) follows the same steps. 25 To understand these results, consider the e¤ect of an increase in c A on Pr (hj A ; A ). By proposition 3, a higher c A has a positive e¤ect on the expected quality of projects that are implemented in tier A by increasing the quality of projects that are submitted ( A increases), and a negative e¤ect by decreasing E's standards of acceptance ( A decreases). On net, the cost increase has a positive e¤ect if Pr (hj A ; A ) is more responsive to the induced increase in A than to the decrease in A . Now, as seen in (10), Pr (hj A ; A ) is a monotone transformation of the product of the likelihoods of state h inferred from the fact that A submitted the project,
, and from the fact that E accepted it,
. Therefore, the responsiveness of Pr (hj A ; A ) with respect to A can be elicited from the elasticity of the likelihood
with respect to A , while the responsiveness of Pr (hj A ; A ) with respect to A can be elicited from the elasticity of the likelihood
with respect to A . In turn, the former elasticity can be elicited in equilibrium from E's decision problem, described by (6) , as a function of the elasticity of
f l ( A ) with respect to A . It follows that the sign of d dc A Pr (hj A ; A ) can be elicited by comparing the two elasticities as in the text of the proposition. 26 Propositions 2 and 5 reveal that the e¤ects of a higher submission cost to the upper tier of a tiered system of evaluation on the expected qualities of projects implemented by both tiers are qualitatively similar to the e¤ect of a higher submission cost in a model with one tier of evaluation.
More precisely, since a higher c A leads to unambiguous decreases in both A and B , the e¤ect of a higher c A on the quality of projects implemented by the two tiers can be elicited solely by investigating the elasticities of the two likelihoods at the equilibrium values of A and B .
The next proposition presents the e¤ect of an increase in c B . Its proof shares the same steps as the proof of proposition 5 up to equation (11) and is thus omitted.
Proposition 6 Assume that the equilibrium (
Note that by proposition 4, the endogenous condition d t dc B < 0 occurs when a higher c B increases the quality of projects submitted to tier t 2 fA; Bg (due to A shifting some high-signal marginal projects from B to A). Thus, the e¤ect of an increase in c B on the quality of projects implemented by the two tiers depends on the elasticities of the two likelihoods in the neighborhoods of A and B , respectively, and on the sign of the change in the evaluator's strategy (as determined by the corresponding e¤ect on the quality of projects submitted for review at each tier).
As illustrated by counter-example in Barbos (2013) , the condition on the two elasticities,
is not always satis…ed. Therefore, the two results of this section reaf-…rm the main insight in Barbos (2013) , and show that when evaluation is imperfect, an increase in the level of self-screening exerted by the agent may be detrimental to the quality of projects implemented in either tier because of the induced decrease in standards of acceptance. Therefore, a policy maker interested in improving the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcome in a situation where the evaluator learns from the agent's decision, has to account for the fact that enhancing the contribution of the agent in the screening of the projects comes at the cost of a diminishing contribution of the evaluator, which may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented.
In the car transaction example, this means, for instance, that if new regulations lower the seller's potential bene…t from withholding negative information about his car (i.e., b A decreases), then the average quality of cars transacted under both scenarios may actually decrease. Intuitively, since the seller is less likely to be dishonest ( A increases), the buyer is more con…dent in cars advertised as in perfect condition, and is thus less stringent when evaluating them ( A decreases). If the information loss resulting from the buyer's lower standards outweighs the information gain generated by the seller's higher standards, the quality of cars transacted as in perfect condition (tier A) decreases.
Moreover, since the lower temptation to be dishonest makes the seller less likely to present some of the better cars as in perfect condition ( A increases), the buyer also has higher expectations of the quality of cars presented as with some mechanical issues (tier B). Thus, the buyer is more inclined to accept such cars ( B decreases), and so the seller is less inclined to sell a car for scrap ( B increases). The lower standards adopted by both players at tier B do not necessarily imply a decrease in the quality of cars transacted as with issues since cars of better quality are also sold with disclosure of their issues ( A increases). However, this quality does decrease when the condition identi…ed in proposition 5(b) is not satis…ed.
On the other hand, proposition 6 unveils the di¤erential impact of a change in payo¤ parameters at the lower tier. In particular, since a higher value of c B may increase the standards of acceptance at either tier, when these standards do increase, one will observe a decrease in the quality of projects implemented in that tier for the same information structure that would lead to an increase in this quality under an increase in the value of c A .
Introducing a second tier of evaluation
We close by presenting a proposition that compares the equilibrium of a game with one tier of evaluation with the equilibrium from the game with both tiers. More precisely, we analyze the impact of introducing an additional upper or lower tier in a system of evaluation in which only one tier had existed. 27 The proof of the proposition is in appendix A7. Thus, the introduction of a lower tier B in a system of evaluation in which only tier A had existed induces A to be more selective in submitting to tier A, ( 2 A > 1 A ), which allows E to be less stringent in his standards of acceptance at that tier, ( 2 A < 1 A ). On the other hand, the introduction of an upper tier A in a system in which only tier B had existed lowers the expected quality of projects received by tier B, inducing E to become more stringent, ( 2 B > 1 B ). In turn, this makes A more selective in submitting marginal projects to tier B, ( 2 B > 1 B ).
These results have two policy implications. First, 2 A > 1 A suggests an additional intuitive mechanism to induce more self-screening by the agent at tier A. Thus, by introducing a new lower bene…t tier of evaluation, tier A receives for review projects of higher quality. The quality of projects submitted between the two tiers does decrease in this case ( 2 B < 1 A ), so this lowers the overall burden on the evaluator if the cost of evaluation at the upper tier is su¢ ciently higher than at the lower tier. On the other hand, 2 B > 1 B implies that by introducing a new upper tier, A will refrain from submitting low-quality projects to the lower tier B, increasing the quality of projects submitted between the two tiers. Moreover, since 2 B > 1 B it also follows that introducing tier A increases the quality of projects implemented between the two tiers. These …ndings lend additional support for a tiered system of evaluation as an e¢ cient mechanism of project screening.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the e¤ect of changes in payo¤ parameters on the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcome in a game where the owner of a project of unknown quality faces a tiered system of evaluation to which he can submit his project for review. We consider a setup where evaluation is imperfect, and thus the evaluator is a strategic player who adjusts his strategy in response to changes in the quality of projects that are submitted. When the agent's payo¤ parameters at the upper tier makes submitting to this tier highly appealing, we show that negative assortative matching may emerge in equilibrium where projects of lower quality are submitted to the upper tier, and those of higher quality to the lower tier. Unlike previous results from the literature, in a system of evaluation with multiple tiers, a higher submission cost may decrease the quality of projects that are submitted. In particular, a higher submission cost at the upper tier decreases the quality of projects submitted between the two tiers, while a higher cost at the lower tier may simultaneously decrease the average quality of projects submitted at both tiers. We also investigate the e¤ect of payo¤ parameters on the quality of projects that are implemented, and show that changes in these payo¤s that induce the agent to exert a higher level of self-screening may not be bene…cial because of the ensuing relaxation of the standards of acceptance. Finally, by comparing the equilibrium outcomes from a tiered system of evaluation with the outcome from a system with only one tier, we provide support for a tiered system of evaluation as a more e¢ cient project screening mechanism.
On the other hand, for A's belief we have Pr(fa t gj ) = Pr(fa t gj ; h) Pr(hj ) + Pr(fa t gj ; l) Pr(lj ) = Pr(fa t gjh) Pr(hj ) + Pr(fa t gjl) Pr(lj ) = [Pr(fa t gjh) Pr(fa t gjl)] Pr(hj ) + Pr(fa t gjl)
where for the second equality we used the fact that is redundant for A's inference about E's action when conditioning on the quality of the project. Since in any equilibrium, the evaluator uses a cuto¤ strategy, we have fa t g = f : ts g, and thus Pr(fa t gjh) Pr(fa t gjl) = Pr( ts jh) Pr( Is jl) = F l ( ts ) F h ( ts ). The monotone likelihood ratio property implies …rst order stochastic dominance, and thus F l ( ts ) F h ( ts ) > 0. On the other hand, by Bayes'Rule we have
which is increasing in g h ( ) g l ( ) , and thus increasing in since d 
where for the third equality we used again Pr(fa t gj ; q) = Pr(fa t gjq). Since @ @ [Pr(hj )] > 0, it follows that @ @ [b A Pr (fa A gj ) b B Pr (fa B gj )] has the same sign for all values of , i.e., the sign
Let 0 be the solution to b A Pr (fa A gj 0 ) b B Pr (fa B gj 0 ) = c A c B , 00 be the solution to
Pr (fa A gj 00 ) = c A b A and 000 be the solution to Pr (fa B gj 000 ) = c B b B , and assume for the time being that all these solutions are interior in [0; 1]. We have two cases to consider. (i ) Assume 
Rearranging this last condition, we conclude that it is satis…ed whenever assumption 1(ii ) is satis…ed, so the proof of the lemma is complete. f h (e 1 ) = 1 (by the de…nition of e 1 ) and d
< 0 (from assumption 2(ii )),
Now, if As < e 2 , where, by its de…nition, e 2 is the solution to
> 0 for any Bs < As . To see this, assume …rst that As > e 1 . Then, since e 2 > As > e 1 , by (16) F l ( As ) F h ( As )
On the other hand, if As < e 1 then F l ( As ) F h ( As ) > F l ( Bs ) F h ( Bs ) by (16) and the fact that As > Bs . Since b A > b B , it follows again that
On the other hand, if As > e 2 and Bs is su¢ ciently close to e 1 , then b
To understand the lemma, note …rst that e 1 is the point at which the di¤erence F l ( ) F h ( ) is maximized, whereas when As is su¢ ciently high, the di¤erence F l ( As ) F h ( As ) is small.
Therefore, when As is high and Bs is close to e 1 , the probability that a high-quality project is identi…ed as such from the evaluator's signal is higher when submitting it to tier B (meaning that E will observe a signal Bs with high probability, conditional on h, and with a low probability, conditional on l). The likelihood of a high-quality project is increasing in the signal . Thus, given the low probability of acceptance at tier A, when A has a higher signal, he is more likely to submit the project to tier B in order to have it identi…ed as being of high quality and accepted. On the other hand, if b A c A is high enough, the expected payo¤ from submitting the project to tier A may be positive even when is small and As is high. Therefore, when A has a low signal he prefers submitting the project to tier A rather than not submitting it at all. On the other hand, A's strategy of submitting to tier B for high signals and to tier A for lower signals, E's best response is precisely to adopt a high As and a moderate Bs . Therefore, negative assortative matching may occur in equilibrium.
Appendix A4. Proof of Lemma 3.2
Employing (14) in (13), it follows that Pr(fa t gj ) = g h ( ) g l ( ) 1 g h ( ) g l ( ) 1
From (2), under the equilibrium regularity that we assume throughout, we have then that given As and Bs , A submits a project to tier A if and only if
The last inequality implies that A employs a cuto¤ As de…ned by (4) 
These conditions are not satis…ed generically, but they are necessary conditions for the regular equilibrium under consideration. To see this, note …rst that from the argument in appendix A1, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for positive assortative matching is that b
Now, we have three cases to consider.
then it immediately follows that b B 1 F l ( Bs ) b A 1 F l ( As ) + c A c B < 0, but also that b A 1 F h ( As ) b B 1 F h ( Bs ) + c B c A > 0 by using (18). So A will never submit a project to tier B, which is something that we precluded by the regularity assumption. (ii ) If
using (18). So A will never submit a project to tier A, which is again something that is precluded by the regularity assumption. (iii ) Finally, the case when b (17), implies A employs a cuto¤ Bs de…ned by (5) . g l ( As ) g h (u). Integrating this last inequality with respect to u between Bs and As , we obtain
i which immediately then implies (19). On the other hand, g h ( Bs ) g l ( Bs ) < g h (u) g l (u) for u 2 ( Bs ; As ], implies g h ( Bs ) g l (u) < g l ( Bs ) g h (u), which integrated with respect to u between Bs and As , implies
i which implies (20). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Appendix A7. Proof of Proposition 7
From Barbos (2013), with only one tier of evaluation, the equilibrium is given by
where 1 t ; 1 t denotes the equilibrium strategies of the game in which E only o¤ers tier t 2 fA; Bg.
Consider …rst the case when the initial tier is A, and then tier B is introduced. Assume by contradiction that 2 A 1
A . Then
where the …rst equality follows from (22) with t = A, the second equality follows from (6) . Thus,
, so by assumption 2(ii ), we have that 2 A 1 A . Therefore, from (21), 1
. On the other hand, from (4), we have
which would then imply that
A ) , and thus that 2 A > 1 A contradicting the initial assumption. Thus, note that
But this last inequality follows from the fact that 2 A > 2 B implies from (4) and (5) that
Therefore, indeed 2 A > 1 A , which then from (22) and (6) immediately also implies that 2 A < 1 A .
For the second part of the proof, consider the case when the initial tier is B and then tier A is introduced, and assume by contradiction that 2 B 1 B . From (21) and (5), this implies that 2 B 1 B . Therefore, from (22) it follows that 1
. Therefore, to complete the contradiction argument, it would be enough to show that 1
, because this would immediately imply 2 B > 1 B . But from (7) we have 1
, so it su¢ ces to show that
) . This is true from (19). Therefore, indeed 2 B > 1 B , which from (21) and (5) also implies that 2 B > 1 B .
